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Introduction
The international crisis had serious effects on the economy of the European Union. The Central and Eastern
European members (EU10) experienced the crisis effects to a different extent, but most of them were coping with 
high debt and decreasing GDP. Domestic consumption and investment activity fell, thus export remained the 
major possible source of growth. Although in 2009, exports shrank drastically (this was the year of the general 
international trade collapse) but in the next year, it already gained momentum. In this paper the characteristics of 
the export patterns in the EU10 member states are analysed.37
EU10 countries differ regarding the economic role of the tradable sector and its development. As we can see in 
Table 1, already as early as 1995, the share of export of goods and services compared to GDP was higher than 
the EU average in almost all EU10 countries but this increased to extremely high levels in 2013, reaching almost 
100% in Slovakia and Hungary. Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic also had rather high levels of 
“openness”
In the first part, the foreign trade dynamics of the two regions are described. The second part analyses the 
product structure of exports and its changes. The third part deals with the inclusion of the observed countries into 
global value chains. The last part forms groups within EU10 and concludes.
General trends in foreign trade 
38
During the past decade the share of EU10-trade increased not only in their GDP but in world trade too. Table 2 
shows that their share in world exports is similar to their share in world imports. The table also demonstrates that 
since accession to the EU (and even before), the share of exports in world total exports has grown significantly 
and continuously for almost all countries. Even in 2009 when trade generally collapsed, these countries 
maintained (or even increased) their share in world trade. However, after the crisis, in 2012-2013, their share 
decreased, but in general still to a somewhat lesser extent than the market share of the whole EU. Certain 
countries have lost competitiveness after the crisis. The decrease of world export market share was most 
pronounced for Hungary with almost 20% loss
. The values of Poland are similar to the EU-average and those of Romania are slightly below. Trade 
per capita data also show the importance of trade in a given country. All economies have higher figures than the 
EU-average. In this respect again Bulgaria and Romania have the lowest figure. Thus, in general the vast 
majority of EU10 countries are heavily dependent on exports.
39
37 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania
38 Of course if we take the total trade into consideration – including imports – then figures compared to GDP are approximately double. 
39 Data from Eurostat, Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)
. Slovenia has also shown a considerable decrease, while 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania a high increase. 
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Table 1: Export of goods and services compared to GDP, percent
1995 2000 2004 2009 2013 Trade per capita (USD)
European Union (27 countries) 29.49 35.79 35.71 36.87 44.83 11341
Czech Republic 48.08 60.93 62.98 58.95 78.60 22608
Poland 23.20 27.12 37.49 39.44 47.80 27600
Hungary 45.21 74.60 63.35 77.58 96.05 29572
Slovenia 49.59 53.70 57.81 59.35 78.15 11594
Slovakia 57.76 70.45 74.54 70.59 97.64 32570
Estonia 68.07 84.60 73.07 63.86 87.99 29022
Lithuania 41.78 41.95 44.04 43.93 59.67 20216
Latvia 47.46 44.51 51.85 54.23 86.90 15123
Bulgaria 51.92 50.46 51.93 47.51 70.22 8845
Romania 25.50 32.83 35.84 30.60 42.15 6653
Note: Trade per capita is estimated as an economy's total trade of goods and commercial services (exports + imports, balance of 
payments basis) divided by the population. It is calculated on the basis of data for 2010-2012 (WTO).
Source: Eurostat, WTO
Table 2: Market shares of the EU10 countries
Share in world total
Exports
Change 5 
years*
Share in world total
Imports
2005 2007 2009 2012 2009-2013 2005 2007 2009 2012
EU27 countries 17.50 16.44 16.20 14.67 na 18.58 18.38 17.39 15.37
Czech Republic 0.75 0.88 0.91 0.85 -7.4 0.71 0.83 0.83 0.76
Poland 0.86 1.0 1.08 1.01 -0.4 0.94 1.14 1.16 1.07
Hungary 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.56 -19.0 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.51
Slovenia 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.17 -16.6 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.17
Slovakia 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.44 -2.2 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.42
Estonia 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 7.3 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09
Lithuania 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 20.8 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.17
Latvia 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 11.4 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.09
Bulgaria 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 5.7 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.18
Romania 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.31 10.5 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.38
EU10 countries 3.35 3.88 4.04 3.82 na 3.63 4.06 3.84 3.53
* Eurostat data (MIP)
Source: WTO Trade Profiles, (merchandise trade)
When analysing world market shares we should not forget that data include cross-border movements of parts and 
components, thus are influenced by the activity of global value chains (that are important in EU10 trade, see 
later). Exports of final goods are often composed of imports of intermediate goods (Beltramello et al. 2012), 
therefore export market shares and competitiveness largely depend on imports.
Poland, as the largest country is also the largest trader within the examined country-group. This has already been 
shown by its share in world exports and imports and also by the largest value numbers (Table 3). The second 
largest trade value belongs to the Czech Republic. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have rather similar figures at 
the middle level and the trade of other countries is lower.
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Table 3: Trade with and outside the European Union
2013
Extra-EU 
export.
Intra-EU export
Extra-EU 
Import
Intra-EU import
mn euro mn euro
share in 
total
mn euro mn euro
Share in 
total
Hungary 19163 62206 76.45 21747 53602 71.14
Czech Republic 23380 98209 80.77 25381 82640 76.50
Slovakia 11264 53491 82.61 15912 45764 74.20
Poland 38677 113457 74.58 48595 105842 68.53
Slovenia 7998 17696 68.87 8722 16489 65.40
Estonia 3564 8705 70.95 2500 11169 81.71
Lithuania 10940 13604 55.43 10404 15804 60.30
Latvia 3661 7231 66.39 2694 10760 79.97
Bulgaria 8923 13306 59.86 10465 15381 59.51
Romania 15181 34392 69.38 13498 41781 75.58
Source: Eurostat Comext
Table 3 also provides the share of the EU in exports and imports. The EU is the least “important” in Lithuanian 
and Bulgarian trade, with 55-60% share. However, more than 80% of Slovakian and Czech exports is directed to 
and around 80% of Estonian and Latvian imports come from the EU. An important feature of Baltic foreign trade 
is the significant trade with each other, which was promoted by EU accession. In the exports of Latvia, the two 
other Baltic States have a 28% share, in Estonian exports this is 16.2% and in Lithuanian exports 15.6%. In 
imports, the respective figures are 27.7%, 17.8% and 9%. Thus, Latvia is the most “Baltic-oriented” trader.
Trading with the EU shows a surplus for the Central-European economies and a deficit for the Baltic and 
Bulgaria, Romania. Regarding the past decade, trade balance in general deteriorated considerably as a 
consequence of the international crisis. Figure 1 shows that with the small exception of Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, all observed countries had negative balances in 2008. For 2013, significant adjustment took place in all 
countries. Adjustment was especially large in the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (this latter had 
the highest trade surplus in the group surpassing 8% of GDP in 2013.)40
40 The Hungarian trade surplus is mainly due to the marked decline in imports as a consequence of the crisis. Import growth remained 
moderate even afterwards due to low domestic demand (Bodnár et al., 2013). Halpern-Oblath (2014) also emphasize the poor 
performance of the economy (strong decrease of private investments, consumption) - partly explained by deleveraging in the private sector 
– underlying low import necessity and export surplus. Apart from goods, trade balance in services has always been positive since 2000.
. Trade balance improvement in several 
cases was due to the decline and slowdown of imports and to the positive role of the service sector.
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Figure 1a: Trade balance in percentage of GDP, 2008
Source: Eurostat
Figure 1b: Trade balance in percentage of GDP, 2013
Source: Eurostat
The role of the European Union as the most important trade partner for the EU10 area is unquestionable. The 
share of imports coming from the EU remained relatively constant, mainly between 60-80% for the EU10 during 
the observed period. In the case of exports it is perhaps surprising that we can observe a general constant 
decrease of the weight of EU in exports (see Figure 2a and b).
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Figure 2a.: Development of intra-EU export shares
Source: Eurostat
Figure 2b: Development of intra-EU import shares
Source: Eurostat
Regarding the export dynamics, they also reflect the above described trend: in the past decade exports to non-
EU areas have increased at a much higher rate than exports to the EU (Figure 3a and b). The outward increase 
has been the strongest in the case of the Baltic countries and Slovakia throughout the period.
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Figure 3a.: Increase of Extra-EU exports
Figure 3b.: Increase of Intra-EU exports
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data
Figure 3a shows that this dynamic increase of extra-EU exports is not only a consequence of the crisis, it has 
begun long before, since around 2004-2005.  Regarding Estonia, the most important non-EU market is Russia 
with a 11.4% share of total exports in 2013 (in 2004 this share was 5.6%) and Norway and USA have around 3-
4% share constantly. In the case of Lithuania, the share of Russia was 19.8% in total exports, being the most 
important export market (in 2004 this share was 9.3%). Belarus (5.2%), Ukraine (3.4%) and Norway (2.8%) are 
important non-EU markets too. In the exports of Latvia, Russia is also the leading market since 2010, it had a 
share of 16.1% in 2013 (in 2004 this figure was 6.4%).
Slovakia mainly exports to Germany and to neighbouring countries but the share of Russia (4%), China (2.5%) 
and Turkey (1.5%)41
41 Data for 2013.
increased between 2009 and 2013. Similar process has been going on regarding Czech 
exports, Russia increased its share (to 3.7%) and to a lesser extent China (1.2%) and Turkey (1.4%). Germany is 
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also the main market for Hungary just like neighbouring EU countries, but here too the share of Russia (3.1%), 
Ukraine (2.4), China (1.76%) and Turkey (1.65%) increased after the crisis. Slovenia’s main export markets are 
also EU members but Russia increased its share – even before the crisis - and became the 6th most important 
destination with 4.6% share in 2013. The share of Serbia also increased. In Polish exports, Germany’s weight 
was still 25% in 2013, but Russia ranked fifth with 5.3% share and Ukraine and Turkey also increased their 
weight (to 2.8 and 1.5% respectively). For Bulgaria and for Romania, Turkey is the most important non-EU 
partner with 9% and 5% shares of total exports.
In sum, data show on one hand that regarding foreign trade, the ten new member countries are integrated in the 
European Union. Trade has been intensive with the EU, because it increased already after the systemic changes 
during the nineties and because after the adhesion, mutual trade among the new members intensified. On the 
other hand, the share of the EU in exports has decreased constantly, or stagnated even after adhesion, because 
exports to non-EU regions have increased more dynamically than to the EU. The markets of Russia, China and 
Turkey (to different degrees) are more and more important for EU10 countries.
Export structure and changes
The export of a given country consists of export of goods and export of services. In certain cases for developing 
countries, service export can be very significant.  As Brenton et al (2009) remark, articles on trade usually focus 
on merchandises and do not involve services, which can be difficult to quantify. Table 4 shows the development 
of the export share of services in the EU10 countries. The most important exported services are from the travel 
and commercial services sector.  Developments in EU10 countries show a decreasing share of services in export, 
which is opposite to general EU trends. While in 1995, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary had more than 
20% share of services in exports (above EU average then), by 2013 this weight decreased radically. However, 
this is only a relative decrease: service export of EU10 in absolute numbers increased to a larger extent between 
2000 and 2013 than the EU–average (see last column). The reason is that service exports of EU10 increased to 
a lesser extent (around three times more) than the export of goods (6-9 times more) during the observed period.
Table 4: Share of services export in total export
percent
1995 2000 2004 2009 2013
Export ratio 
2013/2000
European Union (27 countries) 21.10 22.49 23.65 26.79 25.16 2.0
Poland 14.41 22.62 14.13 17.06 16.25 2.7
Czech Republic 24.82 18.93 13.48 16.41 14.50 2.3
Hungary 28.53 17.93 14.34 19.08 17.50 2.4
Slovenia 19.86 17.72 17.89 21.10 19.90 2.7
Slovakia 22.12 15.88 11.52 10.07 8.39 2.4
Estonia 34.09 31.17 32.69 36.43 27.05 2.7
Lithuania 15.28 20.88 20.96 18.38 17.89 4.7
Latvia 34.16 36.24 30.29 35.42 27.55 3.0
Bulgaria 21.05 33.50 30.93 29.50 20.75 2.5
Romania 16.88 14.85 13.37 19.57 17.30 5.2
Source: Eurostat
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Kandilov – Grennes (2010) indicate that Central and Eastern European countries have different advantages over 
other low-cost Asian and South American rivals for different types of service exports. For those service exports 
that greatly benefit from geographical proximity or office hour synchronization, it is the smaller distance that gives 
CEE exporters a competitive edge. For other types of service exports that benefit from better law enforcement, it 
is the relatively good quality of legal institutions that provides an advantage for these countries.
Service export is the most important for Baltic countries. Based on the available maritime ports, transport is the 
most significant service sector. In the case of Estonia, “other services” (mostly business services) have also high 
share in service export (see Table 5).
The share of “other business services” is the highest in Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Hungary has by far the highest export of “personal, recreational, cultural” services and royalties, licence fees. 
Romania had in 2013 the highest share of computer, information service exports (in 2004 this share was rather 
low).  The business and informatics service export is due to the increased activity of multinational outsourcing, 
shared service centres. Romania is among the top ten global outsourcing locations,42 has information technology
clusters and keeps attracting large telecommunication and informatics companies.43
Table 5: Distribution of exported services
percent
BG RO CZ HU PL SK SI EE LV LT
Transport 20.15 34.98 23.53 23.39 30.50 28.13 25.48 37.72 45.18 61.16
Travel 53.42 10.04 32.46 23.80 28.44 33.65 38.75 23.43 17.63 20.59
Other services 26.42 54.98 44.01 52.81 41.06 37.65 35.77 38.85 37.20 18.24
Communications 1.25 4.82 2.47 1.37 1.36 1.90 5.94 4.03 2.88 1.52
Construction 1.00 3.87 2.78 1.81 3.80 4.25 5.15 5.01 3.29 2.63
Insurance 2.29 0.87 1.27 0.18 0.51 0.66 1.28 0.11 0.54 0.00
Financial services 0.69 2.03 0.15 0.89 1.25 0.75 0.46 1.63 6.99 0.92
Computer, information 8.83 13.75 9.54 6.49 7.36 7.47 2.52 5.67 5.20 1.71
Royalties, licence fees 0.35 0.86 1.14 5.61 0.79 0.06 0.79 0.19 0.39 0.34
Other business services 11.16 27.67 25.39 28.48 25.04 21.84 18.58 20.68 16.59 9.78
Personal, cultural,
recreational services 0.79 0.29 1.11 7.43 0.94 0.61 0.95 0.71 0.52 0.50
Government services
n.i.e. 0.06 0.82 0.16 0.55 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.81 0.80 0.85
Source: UNCTAD: Data on Trade in Services44
42 http://www.outsourcing-journal.org/cee-2/915-romania-among-top-10-outsourcing-locations-globally
43 http://business-review.eu/featured/vodafone-opens-new-shared-services-center-in-romania-receives-state-aid-66715
44“Personal, cultural, recreational services”: Audio-visual and related services cover the production of motion pictures, video and radio 
programmes, musical recordings, (and similar) including fees paid to personnel involved. Related limited distribution rights are also 
covered. Fees paid for sporting, theatrical and similar events belong to this category as well. Services associated with museums, libraries, 
archives, and other cultural and sporting activities and education and health services are also covered under this category.
“Computer and information” services consist of hardware and software-related services and data-processing. New agency services include 
the provision of news, photographs and feature articles to the media. Other information services cover database services: database 
conception, data storage and dissemination of data. Direct non-bulk subscriptions to periodicals regardless of means of information 
transmission also belong to this service category.
“Other business services” include merchanting and other trade-related services; operational leasing services; and miscellaneous business, 
professional and technical services (legal, advertising, consulting, accounting, R&D, etc.)
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Merchandise export concentration
Focusing on the export of goods, an important structural feature can be concentration or diversification.
According to one viewpoint, concentration increases vulnerability, while diversified trade can mitigate crisis 
effects. However this statement should be refined: a lot depends on the type of products the country is 
concentrated on (primary and homogeneous products or not). Bacchetta et al. (2009) show that export 
diversification (both product and geographic type) increases with the level of development of a country. Cadot et 
al. (2011) show that this increase of export diversification lasts to a certain point and for highly developed 
countries concentration is increasing again.  Across countries and time, there is a hump-shaped relationship 
between export diversification and level of income, with a turning point for reconcentration around 25 000 dollars 
per capita GDP (PPP). The reason is that richer countries close old export lines far from their endowments (Cadot 
et al., 2011).
The level of export concentration varies among EU10 countries. Gurgul-Lach (2013) examine the economic 
growth effects of export diversification in the case of CEE countries using data from 1995-2011. According to their 
results, export concentration correlated with economic growth before the crisis but afterwards the situation 
changed. Countries with more concentrated export structures (like Slovakia, Lithuania) experienced stronger 
growth decrease than those with more diversified exports (like Poland and the Czech Republic). These latter 
economies experienced smaller shocks.
Let us examine the recent characteristics of EU10 export concentration. Based on SITC 3 digit data45 the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (Hirschman, 1945) was calculated for the exports of countries towards 
the EU and non-EU areas.
HHI = (isi)1/2
where „i””is the given product group, „si” is its share in total exports. If HHI is 100 we speak about total 
concentration, the smaller the index the more diversified the export structure is.
Table 6: Concentration indices, 2004-2013
Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export
2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013
Hungary 22.98 29.34 19.31 19.77 17.04 15.31
Czech Republic 13.76 14.65 17.52 14.87 15.02 15.94
Slovakia 44.58 33.56 38.95 17.87 20.70 20.36
Poland 14.17 13.17 13.65 14.81 14.18 12.76
Slovenia 18.50 17.00 19.81 17.51 18.69 16.13
Estonia 15.75 25.00 17.09 22.47 14.16 18.21
Lithuania 29.24 22.87 19.95 23.53 27.53 28.36
Latvia 17.16 15.26 19.15 21.80 13.75 14.09
Bulgaria 20.45 29.97 30.28 17.97 16.89 14.96
Romania 22.82 22.70 18.97 19.74 15.33 15.90
Source: author’s calculation from Eurostat data
45 The 3 digit product list is here: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/UnctadStatMetadata/Classifications/UnctadStat.SitcRev3Products.Official.Classification_En.pdf
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As Table 6 shows, the values of concentration indices are quite similar for the ten economies, except for 
Slovakian export, Bulgarian extra-EU and Lithuanian intra-EU export, these are much more concentrated than the 
other flows.
In general terms, extra-EU exports are more concentrated than intra-EU ones. However, regarding a longer 
period, we observe increases and decreases in export concentration. Concentration towards extra-EU markets 
increased somewhat in the case of Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Hungary and Poland has 
diversified their exports a little to both areas. Slovakia and Lithuania have decreased concentration to the extra-
EU region but increased it to EU areas.
What are the main exported products from these countries? Table 7 enumerates the most important five product 
groups (in order of importance, among 280 items in the SITC 3 digit list) in extra-EU and intra-EU exports. Their 
aggregate share in total exports is given in brackets.
Table 7: Main export products and structural similarity between intra- and extra-EU relations
Extra-EU Intra- EU
Similarity index 
2004
Similarity index 
2013
Hungary
Telecom. euipments, 
medicaments, motor cars and 
parts, autom. data processing 
machines, electrical app. (35%)
Piston engines, motor cars and 
parts, telecom.equipments, 
electrical app.(27%)
64.8 71.5
Czech Republic
Motor cars and parts, autom. 
data processing 
machines,telecom.equipments, 
electrical app.(31%)
Motor cars and parts, autom. 
data processing 
machines,telecom.equipments, 
manuf.of base metal (28%)
70.1 73.3
Slovakia
Motor cars, their parts telecom 
equipments, monitors, pumps 
and compressors (59%)
Motor cars, monitors, telecom 
equipments,petroleum + oils 
(40%)
53.9 62.3
Poland
Ships, boats, telecom 
equipments, furniture, motor 
vehicle parts, petroleum oils 
(19%)
Furniture and parts, motor cars 
and parts, monitors, engines 
(20%)
68.0 69.0
Slovenia
Medicaments, motor cars, wood, 
paper, household electrical 
equipm.(32%)
Motor cars, medicaments, 
electr.machinery, petroleum oils, 
furniture (27%)
66.2 63.7
Estonia
Petroleum oils, civil 
engine.plants,telecom.equipm.,al
coholic beverages,paints  (30.0)
Telecom.equipments,petroleum 
oils, furniture,electric 
current,manuf.of base metal 
(29.2)
38.7 58.5
Lithuania
Petroleum oils, motor 
cars,vegetables,wheats, 
fruits,nuts  (31.6)
Petroleum oils, 
furniture,fertilisers, polyacetals, 
articles of plastic (42.8)
48.3 57.2
Latvia
Alcoholic beverages,wheat, 
medicaments,wood,ferrous 
waste (31.1)
Petroleum oils, wood, 
telecom.equipm.,
wood products (23.3)
60.4 50.4
Bulgaria
Petroleum oils, copper and ores, 
medicaments,wheat (47.5)
Copper, oil seeds, petroleum 
oils,electrical app.for 
switching,wheat (24.9)
57.60 56.9
Romania
Petroleum oils,motor vehicles 
and parts, wheat, ships,boats  
(34.9)
Equipm.for destrib.electricity, 
motor cars and parts, furniture, 
footwear (27.8)
58.4 52.1
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Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia export mainly automotive and telecommunication, electrical products. 
These are mainly produced by affiliates of multinational companies. In Polish exports ships and furniture and in 
Slovenia medicaments are rather significant. The percentage numbers in brackets reinforce the above described 
concentration patterns: Slovakian extra-EU exports are strongly concentrated, the first five product groups 
represent more than half of all exports. Slovak export is concentrated on personal cars. 
Regarding Baltic countries and Bulgaria, Romania, the pattern is different. They export more raw and base 
material, agricultural and wood products. Petroleum oil products lead the exports in most cases. In Estonia, it is 
Russian oil exported to other countries through Estonia’s ports. Transit volumes of oil products are large, but 
added value in this sector is small.46 Transit of Russian cargo and oil is important in other Baltic ports too. In 
Lithuania oil refinery is also important, PKN Orlen Lietuva is the most significant supplier of petrol and diesel fuel 
in the Baltic countries, its products are also exported to Western Europe, USA, Ukraine, and other countries47. In 
Bulgaria (Burgas) and in Romania (Ploiesti) there are two big refineries of Lukoil that export around half of their 
products abroad.48
Based on the above shown pattern of main products, it is no wonder that the share of high-tech products in 
exports is by far the highest in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia (see table 8, the list of high-
technology products is given by the Eurostat
In order to measure to what extent the export structures are similar to EU and to non-EU areas, the Finger-
Kreinin similarity index was calculated (Finger-Kreinin, 1979):
S(ab,c)= {SUM_min[Xi(ac),Xi(bc)]}*100
where Xi(ac) is the share of „i” product in total exports to the EU (country “a”), Xi(bc) is the share of „i” product in 
total extra-EU exports (country “b”).
Table 7 shows the values of the index for 2004 and 2013. The Czech Republic and Hungary export in the most 
similar structure to the EU and to non-EU regions. In the majority of countries, intra-extra-EU similarity increased 
between 2004 and 2013, except for Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. In general, Central-European export to EU 
and non-EU markets are more similar and the export of Baltic countries and Bulgaria, Romania differs more in the 
case of EU and non-EU markets.
Technology intensity
49 based on the OECD definition.).
46 http://www.swedbank.lt/lt/previews/get/4259/rss
47 http://www.orlenlietuva.lt/EN/Company/Pages/default.aspx
48 http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_257_.html 
49 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an5.pdf.
$QGUHDeOWHWĘ)RUHLJQWUDGHWUHQGVLQWKH(8FRXQWULHV
52 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries
Table 8: Share of high-tech products in exports 
percent
Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export
2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013
Hungary 23.9 31.1 19.5 17.9 14.5 12.8
Czech Republic 18.1 16.9 18.3 12.4 12.2 12.4
Slovakia 3.9 5.2 10.1 2.5 4.9 9.3
Poland 3.9 5.0 8.4 2 3.9 5.9
Slovenia 8.5 8.1 8.6 3.2 3.7 3.9
Estonia 6.6 4.5 10.5 10.7 8.7 16.6
Lithuania 3.1 6.8 4.6 2.0 6.1 6.5
Latvia 6.5 6.0 6.8 1.9 3.7 8.4
Bulgaria 3.0 3.4 3.8 2.1 3.6 3.8
Romania 2.8 4.4 3.1 3.1 5.6 6.6
Source:author’s calculations from Eurostat Comext database
Table 5: Share of high-tech products in imports 
percent
Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export
2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013
Hungary 33.1 26.2 26.4 12.5 11.4 11.1
Czech Republic 23.6 21.3 24.9 12.2 10.9 11.6
Slovakia 12.3 8.7 19.8 8.5 9.8 14.9
Poland 10.7 8.9 10.4 8.5 9.5 10.2
Slovenia 8.4 5.8 5.9 7.3 7.2 6.4
Estonia 18.4 8.2 16.4 10.2 7.6 12.8
Lithuania 4.8 2.8 2.2 8.3 6.3 7.1
Latvia 6.1 5.7 13.3 6.6 6.9 6.7
Bulgaria 7.0 3.4 3.9 5.9 8.1 8.7
Romania 12.3 7.8 8.8 6.8 8.6 10.1
Source: author’s calculations from Eurostat Comext database
In Estonia, the massive high-tech export of telecommunication equipment is due to the Swedish Ericsson 
affiliate50
50 http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/article/2012/8/21/ericsson-eesti-becomes-estonia-s-largest-manufacturing-corporation 
(that bought the local Elcoteq affiliate in 2009). Like other EU10 countries, Estonia does not possess a 
highly R&D intensive ICT and electronics industry. Foreign investment enterprises have located only relatively 
less demanding production functions here (Tiits-Kalvet, 2012).
The share of high-tech products in imports is also high and even higher in several cases than in exports. 
Generally, in 2013, there were three EU10 countries that had more or less equal weight of high tech products in 
export and import: Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. They import several high tech products from non-EU 
countries as well, for example from Asia. The Central Europe-Asia trade is especially high-WHFKLQWHQVLYHeOWHWĘ-
Toporowski, 2013).
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Certainly, as Damijan et al. (2013) states, an increased share of high-technology products in exports is not per se 
an indicator of higher export competitiveness. They explain that traditional export items have been substantially 
upgraded or differentiated in the CE countries. Secondly, export restructuring has been accompanied by quality 
upgrading as indicated by increased value added per employee, increased unit values and more engagement in 
medium and high quality segments of industries. Thirdly, the share of vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade 
with the EU has increased as a consequence of multinational production networks. Of course, structural change 
in itself does not necessarily lead to increase of competitiveness, quality of changes matter.  Benkovskis and 
Wörz (2012), analysing export competitiveness of EU10 in 2004-2007, show that these economies experienced a 
loss in price competitiveness and a larger increase of unit values of their exports than their competitors. 
Furthermore, the average quality of their goods increased more than their export prices, indicating improvements 
in non-price competitiveness.
Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania have relatively low share of high-technology exports to both EU and non-
EU areas. The majority of Lithuanian manufacturing value-added is produced in low-tech industries (Laskiene-
Venckuviene, 2014) and Lithuanian export is specialised on food, drinks, tobacco and chemical products 
(Bernatonyte et al., 2013). Bulgaria’s low share of high-tech-intensive export is attributed among other factors to 
the limited and constantly decreasing R&D expenditures. As Zhelev-Tzanov (2012) concludes EU integration of 
Bulgaria has not yet accelerated structural transformation and technological upgrading as in other EU10 
countries, the process has already started but it is rather slow. In Romania, the automotive multinational affiliates 
induce certain high-tech export (Platis-Hagiu 2012) but the general level is low. 
Concerning the high-tech-intensity of trade, the heavy weight of high-tech import beside export and the identity of 
the trading companies lead us to conclude that the traded high tech products are mainly those automotive and 
electronic ones that are produced in the networks of global value chains.
Global value chains and EU10 countries
The increasing role of global value chains (GVCs) was already apparent in the beginning of the 2000s51
51 Baldwin (2012) analyses the development and role of GVCs in world trade in detail. The development of ICT technologies from the 
second half of the 80 years made it possible to coordinate production from a long distance and wage differences between developed and
developing countries made outsourcing of production profitable for companies. Thus the second global unbundling of production took
place. (The first unbundling took place after industrial revolution and railway network creation in the late 1800s.)
.
Fragmentation of production increased to a considerable extent in the last decade, especially in the electronic, 
clothing and automotive industry (Lall et al. 2004, Kimura et al. 2005, Srholec 2006). Regarding trading 
companies, export activity in general is quite concentrated in Europe. This means that in most countries, the top 
five percent of the companies account for 70% or more of the total manufacturing exports (Mayer-Ottaviano, 
2007). In developing countries large exporters are in several cases foreign owned multinationals.
Having perceived the decisive role of multinational networks, several developing countries seek to join GVCs to 
assemble goods or make specialised inputs. This is easier and faster than building own supply chains but “less 
meaningful” (Gereffi 2013). Simply participating in GVCs does not necessarily develop domestic innovation, 
institutions, linkages and labour conditions. The challenge for companies in developing countries is how to 
upgrade in a beneficial way within the supply chains.
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International trade in global production networks increased much faster than “normal” trade. According to the 
report of UNCTAD (2013) 80 per cent of global trade (gross exports) is linked to the production network of 
multinational companies. Because of international fragmentation, countries rely also on foreign resources to 
produce and export goods. Exports not only reflect the embodied technology and relative domestic endowments, 
but also the technology and factor endowments of countries from which the country imports intermediate goods 
(Beltramello et al., 2012). Thus, imports of intermediates increasingly determine the export competitiveness of 
countries and simply looking at the evolution of exports may be misleading for defining the competitive position of 
a country (see Box 1).
The foreign value added content of exports is a kind of measure of vertical specialisation and GVC inclusion. 
Foster-Stehrer (2013) analysed countries in this respect, based on world input-output table data.  Between 1995-
2011 this foreign value added increased in almost all countries and within the EU, Central European countries 
have very high levels (Figure 4)
Figure 4: Share of foreign value added in exports, 2011
percent
Source: compilation from Foster-McGregor and Stehrer, 2013, p.356.
Among the EU10, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are especially strongly linked to GVCs, and Latvia, 
Romania are linked the least. As we have seen, the effect of foreign multinational companies on export is the 
highest in the first three countries. The old EU member states, mainly Germany involved these economies into 
their production networks already before legal accession to the EU. There had been different stages of this kind 
of integration process, as the example of automotive industry shows: first the regional market was attractive, than 
the Central European countries became hosts of export-oriented assembly and component parts factories. 
Foreign suppliers themselves relocated their production to the CE region (Fortwengel, 2011) and some R&D 
intensive functions were also relocated to this region. 
Non-EU multinationals “discovered” the advantages of the CE region too. Ando and Kimura (2013) even argue 
that Central Europe connects Asia and Europe together within the global production networks. Due to the 
dominance of East Asia in electronics industry, European multinationals have been importing electronic parts and 
components from their affiliates and other Asian firms to use them for their production in CE. The automotive 
industry agglomerations in CE import machinery parts and components from Asia. Furthermore, certain Asian 
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firms themselves have invested in the CE countries and intensified sourcing from Asia. These all have resulted in 
tight production links between East Asia and CE to serve the European market. The strong inclusion into 
multinational networks shaped the revealed comparative advantages and export competitiveness of CE countries 
in the past decade (see Box 1).
Box 1. Competitiveness and comparative advantages in Central Europe
Export performance of countries is often bound to their competitiveness. Competitiveness is usually also a highly 
debated concept. There are several ways to measure and define the competitiveness of a country. However, 
according to well-known authors (Porter, 1990, Krugman,1996) it does not make sense to talk about competitiveness 
of countries. Porter (1990) in his book enumerates several concepts of competitiveness and their factors but argues 
against generalisation. He argues that instead of competitiveness of nations, productivity is more important and even 
productivity is difficult to interpret on national level. Productivity makes sense only at the level of industrial branches. 
Krugman (1996) does not favour the concept of national competitiveness either. He states that countries are not like 
two competing factories; international trade is not a “zero sum game”. Living standard in a given country depends on 
its own domestic economic achievements and not on the comparison with other countries. 
An often used measure concerning competitiveness is the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), or rather 
various types of RCAs . RCA measures for final export goods indicate if a country has a comparative advantage in the 
production in an industry, while RCA measures for imported intermediates show whether a country has a comparative 
advantage in the assembly in a given industry. However, the role of GVCs questions this; countries can import 
intermediates for the production of other intermediates.  Cross-border movement of parts and products within the 
same production network increases the trade of developing countries, “artificially” generating international trade with 
each crossing (Athukorala et al, 2006 - Mani, 2000).
As a consequence, the competitiveness of countries can be overestimated based on gross export data and on indices 
(such as revealed comparative advantage) calculated from gross exports. This is especially true for open countries 
that rely heavily on imported intermediates. Based on world input-output table data, Timmer et al (2012) show that the 
use of imported intermediate inputs and the inclusion in global value chains have increased radically between 1995 
and 2008 in the case of CE countries. Similarly, using world input-output tables, Grodzicki (2014) calculates RCAs 
based on GVC income. The results show that between 1995 and 2011, Central European economies lost their 
previous comparative advantages in traditional industries and formed new RCAs in different types of industries. The 
Czech Republic and Slovakia managed to maintain some of their previous advantages in resourced-based 
manufacturing and Hungary in chemicals but at the same time they developed new, strong industries in modern types 
of activities like transport equipment, machinery and electrical products. Poland, on the contrary, did not undergo such 
a structural change – its RCAs are still mainly in resource-based industries (Grodzicki, 2014).
The international crisis in 2008 and its effects had negative effects on GVCs too. The trade collapse in 2009 was 
deep and was worsened by the general credit crisis. According to literature, global value chains can be a channel 
for the rapid transmission of both real and financial shocks. Demand drop for final goods and credit problems can 
immediately affect flows of intermediates, especially when supplier contracts are short-term. (Milberg & Winkler, 
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2010).As a kind of opposite opinion others (eg. Altomonte & Ottaviano, 2009) point out that supply chains could 
also have been a factor of resilience in the crisis, as existing supply chains are difficult and undesirable to abolish 
because of contractual arrangements and high initial sunk costs.  This drop and quick recovery can be caused by 
the effect of crisis on GVC trade that is mentioned by several authors as the “bullwhip effect” (Escaith et al. 2010, 
Altomonte et al. 2012, Zavacka 2012). This means that low demand expectations force lead firms to adjust by 
their inventories. After the crisis, if demand for the product is recovered, sold out inventories can be accumulated 
again, so trade increase can also be magnified by GVCs.  Sass – Szalavetz (2014) review and sum up the 
empirical literature on the role of GVCs in the crisis and conclude that the results depend on different approaches 
and different methodologies, datasets and time period. They also reinforce the twofold effects of GVCs: on the 
one hand transmitting and amplifying the crisis contributing to the decrease of international trade; on the other 
hand producing a stabilizing effect. This latter took place in a slightly longer run, attributed to the bullwhip effect 
and to the fact that companies inside the value chain helped each other by financing or network rebuilding.
In the EU10 and worldwide, the crisis resulted in reorganisations, relocations of firms. Trade flows largely 
controlled by multinational companies have also been affected by these relocation decisions. Companies 
relocated mostly for improving their competitiveness and this had both negative and positive effects on the trading 
of EU10 countries. Hunya – Sass (2014) found increasing relocation activity to Hungary in the post-crisis years 
until 2011 and found evidence of re-shoring or back-shoring as well. Relocation took place also from Hungary, 
decreasing the Hungarian export capacity significantly in 2012-1452
52 In 2012 Nokia downgraded its affiliate in Hungary, switched assembly to Nokia’s plants in South Korea and in Beijing. Therefore, in 2012
the before huge export of cellular phones from Hungary decreased. In 2014 Microsoft (the owner of Nokia Komárom company announced 
the closure of the firm.
 
. On the other hand, some additional 
investments have been relocated from Western Europe to the EU10 (like Poland) due to low cost seeking of 
PXOWLQDWLRQDOVeOWHWĘ-Toporowski, 2013).
Besides relocation, the crisis probably could induce other positive effects on GVCs in the CE and Southern 
countries. Sass – Szalavetz (2013) analysed the effects of crisis on GVC integrated Hungarian automotive and 
electronic industry based on interviews. According to their results, firms had functional upgrading effects induced 
by the crisis and reorganisation of multinationals.
Conclusion
The recent international crisis accentuated the importance of exports for several EU member countries. The 
EU10 group is not an exception in this respect, most of them are strongly foreign trade – dependent economies. 
The crisis had significant effects on the foreign trade of the EU10 countries, partly in volume (drop and increase), 
partly geographically (increase of non-EU areas). These effects can largely be bound to the international activity 
of multinational companies. 
The foreign trade of the EU10 had been directed towards the European Union already well before the official 
accession. The EU-integration had a major enhancing impact on mutual trade among these countries. Despite 
this trade intensification the share of the EU in exports shows a decrease. Based on the trade performance of 
EU10 described in this study we can conclude that the foreign trade patterns have not been similar for these 
economies. We can form two broad country-groups in this respect.
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The first group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia. The role of export in these small 
countries is very important for growth, these are extremely open economies, the share of exports in GDP and 
trade per capita are very high. These economies became strongly integrated in the global value chains that shape 
their trade structure, dynamics and volume. Their exports are relatively high-tech intensive. The most vulnerable 
among these economies is Slovakia, because its trade pattern is extremely concentrated on motor vehicle 
exports.
The rest of EU10 countries consist a second group, where integration into multinational networks, high-tech 
export is lower, and mainly lower-technology products are exported. This group is even more heterogeneous than 
the previous one, there are larger and smaller countries within.
The inclusion of the EU10 region into the global value chain activity is a fact. The future of these economies 
depends on how they can use this integration, on what level their firms can participate in the worldwide 
production tasks. Fruitful participation in the global value chains depends largely on the local capacities to absorb 
foreign technology, thus on the quality of human capital. In the Baltic countries (but to lesser extent also in other 
EU10 economies) emigration of well qualified people is a severe problem, because it reduces human resources, 
the level of education and has become a long-term mass-phenomenon (Kirch et al. 2011, Staehr, 2013). In all 
EU10 economies the efficient development of human capital and education system would be essential to provide 
a long-term base for good export performance and growth.
$QGUHDeOWHWĘ)RUHLJQWUDGHWUHQGVLQWKH(8FRXQWULHV
58 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries
References
Altomonte C., Di Mauro F., Ottaviano G., Rungi A. & Vicard V. (2012) Global Value Chains during the Great 
Trade Collapse A Bullwhip Effect?, Working Paper no. 1412 (European Central Bank).
Altomonte C. & Ottaviano G. (2009) ’The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects’, VOX, 27 
November, available at: www.voxeu.org accessed 15 July 2013.
Amador, J., Stehrer, R. (2014): Portuguese Exports in the Global Value Chains. Banco de Portugal, Economic 
Bulletin, April 64-77.
Amador, J, Cappariello, R., Stehrer, R. (2013): Global value chains: A view from the euro area.
Ando, M. – Kimura, F. (2013): Production Linkage of Asia and Europe via Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
Economic Integration vol. 28, no.2. June, p. 204-240.
Athukorala, P., Yamashita, N. (2006): Production fragmentation and trade integration: East Asia in a global 
context. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), December:233-256.
Baldwin, R. (2012) Global Supply Chains: Why they emerged, why they matter and where they are going, 
Discussion Paper no. 9103 (London, Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Baldwin, R. and D. Taglioni (2011), “Gravity Chains: Estimating Bilateral Trade Flows When Parts and 
Components Trade is Important”, NBER Working Paper 16672, Cambridge, MA: National Bureauof 
Economic Research.
Bacchetta, M., Jansen, M., Lennon, C, Piermartini, R. (2009): Exposure to external shocks and the geographical 
diversification of exports. in: Newframer, R. et al (eds): Breaking into new markets. Emerging lessons for 
export diversification.Chapter 4.
Beltramello, A., K. De Backer and L Moussiegt. 2012. The Export Performance of Countries withinGlobal Value 
Chanins (GVCs). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2012/02.Paris: OECD 
Publishing.
Benkovskis, K., J. Wörz. 2012. Evaluation of Non-Price Competitiveness in Exports from Central,Eastern and 
South-Eastern European Countries at the EU market. Latvian Bank Working Paper no. 1.
Bernatonyte, D. – Burksaitiene, D. – Rimiene, K. (2013): Trade specialization pattern of Lithuania. Economics and 
Management, Vol. 14, No. 4. p. 661-666.
Bodnár, K. ,Molnár, Gy., Pellényi, G., Szabó, L.,Várhegyi, J. (2013): Dynamics of the trade balance and 
developments n exports and imports. MNB Bulletin Special Issue, October, p. 37-45.
Brenton,P, Newfarmer,R.,Shaw,W, Walkenhorts,P. (2009): Breaking into new markets: Overview (Chapter 1) in: 
Newframer, R. et al (eds): Breaking into new markets. Emerging lessons for export diversification
Cadot, O., Carrere, C, Strauss-Kahn, V. (2011): Export diversification: what’s behind the hump? The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 93, No. 2, p. 590-605.
Cattaneo O., Gereffi G., Miroudot S. & Taglioni D. (2013) Joining, Upgrading and Being Competitive in Global 
Value Chains. A Strategic Framework, Policy Research Working Paper no. 6406 (World Bank), April.
$QGUHDeOWHWĘ)RUHLJQWUDGHWUHQGVLQWKH(8FRXQWULHV
Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 59
Damijan J., Crt K. & Rojec M. (2013) Global Supply Chains at Work in Central and Eastern European Countries: 
Impact of FDI on export restructuring and productivity growth, LICOS Discussion Paper Series no. 332, KU 
Leuven.
Damijan, J.; Kostevc,C.; Rojec,M.(2013): Bright past, shady future? Past and potential future export performance 
of CEE countries in a comparative perspective LICOS Discussion Paper Series, No. 334
eOWHWĘ $ 7RSRURZVNL3   *OREDO YDOXH FKDLQV - shaping trade between Visegrad Countries and Asia. 
Europe-Asia Studies, submitted manuscript ID: CEAS-2013-0154.
Escaith H., Lindenberg N. & Miroudot S. (2010): International supply chains and trade elasticity in times of global 
crisis, MPRA Paper no. 20478 (University Library of Munich, Germany).
Foster-McGregor, N., Stehrer,R. (2013): Value added content of trade: A comprehensive approach. Economic 
letters 120. p. 354-357.
Fortwengel, J. (2011): Upgrading through Integration? The case of the Central Eastern European automotive 
industry. Transcience Journal Vol.2, No.1.p.1-25
Frank, K. (2013) Development of Slovak foreign trade with Asia, Working Paper no. 48 (Institute for Economic 
Research of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (EÚSAV))
Halpern, L. – 2EODWK*$JD]GDViJLVWDJQiOiV³V]tQH´pVIRQiNMD07$.57..7,0ĦKHO\WDQXOPiQ\QR
12
Hunya, G., Sass, M. (2014):  Escaping to the East? Relocation of business activities to and from Hungary, 2003–
2011. MTA KTI Discussion Papers MT-DP – 2014/7
Grodzicki, M.J. (2014): Global Value Chain and Competitiveness of V4 Economies. in: Kiendl-Wendner, D.-Wach, 
K. (eds): International Competitiveness in Visegrad Countries: Macro and Micro Perspectives. FH 
Johanneum, University of Applied Sciences, Graz p.13-32.
Gurgul, H., Lach,L. (2013): Export diversification and economic growth in transition: lessons from the 2008 
financial crisis in CEE. Quantitative methods in economics, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 137-149.
Hoen A., Oosterhaven J. (2006): On the measurement of comparative advantage, The Annals of Regional 
Science, 40(3): 677-91.
Kandilov, I.T., Grennes, T. (2010): The determinants of service exports from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Economics of Transition Volume 18(4) 2010, 763–794
Kimura F., - Takahashi Y. - Hayakawa  K. (2005): Fragmentation and Parts and Components Trade: Comparison 
between East Asia and Europe. Manuscript. 
DOI: http://www.apeaweb.org/confer/hito05/papers/kimura_etal.pdf.
Kirch, A. – Nezerenko,O. – Mezentsev, V. (2011): Estonia and other countries of the Baltic Sea region as actors 
of development: conceptual approach.  European Integration Studies.No. 5. p. 199-204.
Krugman, P. (1996): Making sense of the competitiveness debate. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 12, 
no. 3, p. 17-25
Lall S., - Albaladejo M. - Zhang J. (2004): Mapping fragmentation: Electronics and automobiles in East Asia and 
Latin America, Working Paper Series (QEH), February.
$QGUHDeOWHWĘ)RUHLJQWUDGHWUHQGVLQWKH(8FRXQWULHV
60 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries
Laskiene, D. – Venckuviene, V. (2014): Lithuania’s Export Diversification According to Technological 
Classification. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, vol.5, no.7. May, p. 680-690.
Leromain, E., Orefice, G. (2014):  New Revealed Comparative Advantage Index: dataset and empirical 
distribution. International Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.inteco.2014.03.003
Mani, Sunil (2000): Exports of high technology products from developing countries: is it real or a statistical 
artefact? UNU/INTECH Discussion Papers.
Milberg W. & Winkler D. (2010): Trade Crisis and Recovery. Restructuring of Global Value Chains, Policy 
Research Working Paper 5294 (World Bank). 
Paterka, A. (2013): The evolving structure of the Polish exports (1994 – 2010) – diversification of products and 
trade partners. Gdansk University of Technology Working Paper no. 10.
Platis M.- Hagiu, A. (2012): The evolution of  the Romanian car industry and its position on European market.
Studia urb.negotia LVII, no. 2, p. 65-91.
Porter, M.(1990): The competitive advantage of nations. The Free Press, New York.
Sass, M., Szalavetz, A. (2014): Crisis-related Changes in the Specialization of Advanced Economies in Global 
Value Chains. Competition and Change, Vol.18, no.1. p. 54-69.
Srholec, M. (2006): Fragmentation and Trade: A Network Perspective. In 8.ETSG conference, Vienna, 7-9
September 2006.
Staehr, K. (2013): Austerity in the Baltic States During the Global Financial Crisis. Intereconomics no. 5. p. 293-
302.
Stehrer, R., Stöllinger, R. (2012): Positioning Austria in the Global Economy: Value Added Trade, International 
Production Sharing and Global Linkages. WIIW, FIW.
Tiits, M. – Kalvet, T. (2012): Nordic small countries in the global high-tech value chains: the case of 
telecommunications systems production in Estonia. Working Papers in Technology Governance and 
Economic Dynamics no. 38.
Timmer, Marcel P.–Los, Bart–Stehrer, Robert–De Vries, Gaaitzen (2012): Fragmentation, incomes and jobs. An 
analysis of European competitiveness.WIOD Working paper, no. 9.
UNCTAD (2013): World Investment Report. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development 
(Geneva).
WTO (2013): Supply Chain Perspectives and Issues. A Literature Review. (eds.: Park A., Nayyar G., Low P.) 
World Trade Organization, Geneva.
Zavacka, V. (2012): The bullwhip effect and the Great Trade Collapse. Working Paper no. 148 (London, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).
Zhelev, P. - Tzanov,T. (2012): Bulgaria’s export competitiveness before and after EU accession. East-West 
Journal of Economics and Business. Vol.15, no. 1, p. 107-128. 
Yu,R., Cai, J., Leung P (2009): The normalized revealed comparative advantage index. The Annals of Regional 
Science.Vol 43.no.1. p. 262-282.
